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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Kelleyfs Responsive Brief (January 27, 1989) fails to 
give a complete and accurate representation of the proceedings 
below in several critical respects. Certain portions of 
KelleyTs Brief are not supported by citations to the record as 
required by Rule 24(a)(7), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and are, in fact, not supported by the record itself; other 
portions of Kelley?s Brief refer to matters wholly irrelevant 
to this appeal and prejudicial to Leucadia; still other 
portions of Kelleyfs Brief make statements that are misleading 
and confusing to the Court. As to these portions, more 
specifically delineated below, Leucadia respectfully requests 
this Court to strike the misstatements and to disregard all 
arguments supported by these misstatements, in accordance with 
Rule 24(k), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Alternatively, Leucadia requests that the Court strike the 
entire Brief. See Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 
48 n.l (App. 1989). 
The following portions of KelleyTs Responsive Brief 
should be stricken and disregarded by this Court: 
1. Throughout his Brief, Kelley characterizes 
Leucadia as an "interloper" that is pursuing this appeal 
contrary to the wishes of the defendant below, First Security 
Mortgage Company ("First Security"). Kelley reiterates 
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throughout his Brief that ffFirst Security accepted the 
judgment" and ?f chose not to appeal,ff intimating that this 
appeal is sought only by a third party to create problems for 
Kelley and his family. Examples of these statements are found 
in the following portions of Kelleyfs Brief: Parties to the 
Proceeding Below, II 1; Statement of the Case, p. 7 n.l; 
Introduction, pp. 18-20; Argument, IT 4(k). 
These statements are not only unsupported by citations 
to the record, the statements in fact find no support in the 
record. Indeed, these representations grossly mischaracterize 
the status of Leucadia in this appeal. Leucadia is a party to 
this appeal pursuant to an order of the Third District Court 
that Leucadia be substituted for First Security "for all 
purposes, including the right of appeal, concerning the decree 
of specific performance entered in this action, and all orders 
or judgments relating to or superceding said decree...." 
(R. 844-46) This order was entered pursuant to a stipulation 
and motion of Kelley and First Security. (R. 844-46) These 
unsupported statements made by Kelley should be stricken and 
the arguments supported by these statements disregarded. 
2. At page 7, note 1 of his Brief, Kelley states 
that "First Security and Kelley have settled the issues of an 
abatement of the purchase price, damages and attorneys' fees. 
Kelley has released First Security from those claims and First 
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Security has deeded the Property to Kelley." This statement by 
Kelley of the terms of the settlement is only partially 
correct. For clarification, the settlement agreement provides 
that "First Security reserves its rights to appeal the decree 
of specific performance and all orders relating to or 
superseding said decree." The settlement agreement further 
provides that "Kelley and [First Security] agree that if the 
Court-ordered specific performance is ultimately unwound, Mr. 
Kelley shall be entitled to the return of his down payment with 
interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum. Any 
monthly payments made by Mr. Kelley after the down payment 
shall be retained by [First Security]. Mr. Kelley shall be 
entitled to no reimbursement from [First Security] for the 
value of any improvements he makes to the property." 
Thus, again Kelley has greatly mischaracterized the 
nature of the relationship of the parties and the status on 
appeal. More importantly, these references are not supported 
by citations to the record; indeed, the settlement agreement is 
not part of the record. For these reasons, all statements 
concerning the settlement agreement are not properly before the 
Court and should be stricken. 
3. Kelley consistently makes reference to the fact 
that during this transaction he did not retain Utah counsel on 
the advice of First Security. This statement is found in the 
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following portions of Kelley?s Brief: Statement of the Case, 
p. 3, 5; Statement of the Facts, 11 3(f), IT 4(a); Introduction, 
p. 19; Argument, p. 23, 24. Most of these statements are not 
supported by citations to the record. The statement found in 
the Statement of Facts 1T 3(f) does cite to the record at 289. 
This citation, however, does not support KelleyTs statement 
that "[t]throughout this period, First Security told Kelley 
that it was not necessary for him to retain Utah counsel/1 
Rather, page 289 of the record is an affidavit by Mr. Kelley 
wherein he states that he was informed by Mr. Don Griffin, the 
listing agent on the Property, not to retain an attorney during 
the course of the transaction. Thus, the statements in fact 
are not supported by the record and should not be considered by 
the Court. In addition, Kelley did not raise below the issue 
of whether First Security owed a duty to advise Kelley of when 
to obtain counsel or whether Mr. Griffin when so advising 
Kelley was acting as an agent for First Security. For this 
additional reason, these statements are not properly before the 
Court and should be stricken. 
4. Kelley makes various statements and insinuations 
about the transaction between First Security and Leucadia that 
are unsupported by citations to the record, are misleading, are 
irrelevant to this appeal and are prejudicial to Leucadia. For 
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example, at pages 4-5 of his Brief, Kelley recites the 
following statements as "facts": 
By selling the Property directly to Leucadia, 
First Security could avoid paying a $45,000.00 
real estate commission since its listing 
agreement with Gump & Ayers had expired, it could 
negotiate its way out of the Armstrong lawsuit 
and, at the same time, obtain a higher, cash 
purchase price for the Property. However, before 
these plums could be picked, First Security had 
to get rid of Kelley who, at the time, still 
believed that he and First Security would 
cooperate in resolving the problems and closing 
the Agreement. 
Similar statements regarding the transaction between First 
Security and Leucadia are found at pp. 7-8, 14-15 (U 4(i)), and 
18. For the reasons cited above, these statements should be 
stricken from the record and disregarded by the Court. 
5. Kelley also mischaracterizes the nature of his 
Complaint and the remedies sought therein. At page 17 of his 
Brief (again, without citation to the record), Kelley makes the 
following representations: 
Thus, Kelley was not in breach of the Agreement 
when he deposited his down payment into court 
and, through his Complaint, asked the Court to 
require First Security to convey whatever 
property it owned that was subject to the 
Agreement and interpret whether the Agreement 
required First Security to convey the property 
free of the water and boundary problems. If so, 
Kelley would be entitled to an abatement of the 
purchase price; if not, the full purchase price 
would be paid. 
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Respondent's Brief at 17. Similar misstatements of fact (also 
without citation to the record) appear at pages 19-20. 
In fact, in his Complaint dated September 22, 1987, 
Kelley requested an order of the Court that First Security was 
obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, rectify the property 
damage and then convey the property to Kelley. (R. 1-11) It 
was not until several months later, first reflected in the 
pleadings on November 25, 1987 (R. 140-274), that Kelley 
altered his position and requested the Court order First 
Security to convey "whatever title it has" to the property plus 
damages. (R. 181) 
The remedy sought by Kelley's Complaint is of critical 
importance to disposition of the issues on appeal. KelleyTs 
statement of these "facts" is misleading and confusing for the 
Court, and is prejudicial to Leucadia. As such, these 
statements should be stricken and disregarded by the Court. 
6. In addition to the specific points mentioned 
above, Kelley's Statement of the Case, Summary of the Argument, 
and Point I Introduction should be stricken in their entirety. 
Contrary to the provisions of Rule 24(a)(7), Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Kelley has not limited his Statement of the 
Case to a brief indication of the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings, and its disposition below. Rather, 
Kelley's Statement of the Case sets forth facts not supported 
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by citations to tl le record ai id, i n many instances, not 
supported by the record itself. Moreover, these misstatements 
of fact permeate Kelley's entire argument. For example, 
Kelleyfs Summary of the Argument and Point I Introduction argue 
almost exclusively from the misstated "facts." Although 
Leucadia has made an effort to clarify for the Court the most 
egregious of these misstatements, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate these "facts" from the subsequent 
argument of Re 11 •••--, Accordingly, the Court should strike and 
altogether disregard Kelleyfs Statement of the Case, Summary of 
the Argument, and Point I Introduction, if not his entire 
Brief. See Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 48 n.l 
(App. 1989); Rule 24(k), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Leucadia respectfully requests that the Court strike 
the above-referenced statements that find no support in the 
record, refer to matters wholly irrelevant to this appeal and 
prejudicial to Leucadia, and/or are misleading and confusing 
for the Court. In addition, Leucadia requests that the Court 
strike in their entirety those portions of KelleyTs Responsive 
Brief captioned Statement of the Case, Summary of the Argument, 
and Point; I I nl; nuiuut i on, if not the Brief in its entirety. 
Finally Leucadia requests that all arguments supported by these 
statements be disregarded by this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The subject Earnest Money Agreement between First 
Security, as seller, and Kelley, as buyer, provided two 
specific options in the event First Security was unable to 
convey marketable title to Kelley at the time of closing. 
KelleyTs tender of performance, which recognized the 
unmarketable condition of title, did not comply with those 
options, and was therefore ineffective. Accordingly, the 
agreement expired by its own terms, and the lower court erred, 
as a matter of law, in ordering specific performance of the 
agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PERFORMANCE REQUIRED BY THE PARTIES IS GOVERNED BY THE 
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The essence of Kelleyfs argument as presented in his 
Responsive Brief seems to be as follows. First, Kelley argues 
he was entitled to specific performance of the Earnest Money 
Agreement (ffAgreement") because he tendered the required down 
payment to First Security and was "ready, willing and able to 
perform" in a timely fashion. Respondenty s Brief at 38, 42. 
Second, even if Kelleyfs performance was untimely, First 
Security waived the time of essence provision of the Agreement 
by its conduct and could not then set an "unreasonable 
deadline" for performance. Id. at 22-23, 24-26, 42. Third, 
First Security failed to "perform as agreed" thereby rendering 
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any t: endei o f per f ormance by Ke 11 ey unnecessary . IdL. at 
26-31, 35-38. Fourth, for these reasons, Kelley is entitled to 
specific performance of the Agreement and an abatement in the 
purchase price. Id. at 41-42. 
These arguments, however, fail entirely to deal with 
the facts that are dispositive of the issues on appeal -- the 
terms of the Agreement. The terms of the contract entered into 
by the parties govern the performance required of them. They 
are as follows: 
1. The Agreement is conditioned on the seller 
furnishing good and marketable title to the property as 
evi denced by a current policy of title insurance. (R. 16 U 3) 
2. In the event the seller cannot deliver title free 
of defects not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, 
11: ie buyer 1 ias the c »pt:I on of (1) waiving the defects and 
proceeding with the closing, or (2) requiring the seller to 
return the earnest money deposit and declaring the Agreement 
null and vol-, (R. 15 1T G) 
3. In the event there is damage to the property by 
reason of vandalism, and if seller is able to cure the damage, 
til proceed with the transaction. If, however, the 
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seller is unable to repair or replace the damaged property, the 
Agreement shall be null and void. (R. 17 11 P) 
4. With regard to the extension of closing dates, 
time is of the essence of the Agreement. (R. 17 H Q) 
A. Kelley Never Tendered Performance in Accordance With 
the Terms of the Agreement 
Kelley argues he was entitled to specific performance 
of the Agreement because Kelley's tender of performance was not 
conditional. "It merely demanded First Security to perform as 
it had agreed to perform, that is, convey marketable title to 
the Property with all the pertinent water rights." 
RespondentT s Brief at 17. Kelley argues he "remained ready, 
willing and able to perform under the contract and did in fact 
place funds in an account . . . to be used for the down payment 
. . . . [Kelley] merely demanded that First Security perform as 
agreed: convey marketable title to the Property and the water 
rights that both First Security and Kelley intended and agreed 
would be conveyed." Respondent's Brief at 38. 
The critical assumption of Kelleyfs entire argument is 
that the only performance required by Kelley was to tender down 
1. Kelley fails entirely to deal with the issue of damage to 
the property by virtue of vandalism and the performance 
required by the parties in that event. This issue is discussed 
in Appellant's principal brief at 14-15 and will not be 
reiterated herein. 
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payment t«< Firs* v-u.irilv hul th;it otherwise, First Security 
was required to deliver marketable title regardless of any 
intervening circumstances. This assumption is erroneous; it 
ignores 1. lie plain language of terms bargained for by the 
parties to the Agreement. 
The Agreement anticipated the situation presented in 
this case where a seller would 1 »e t n lable to deliver marketable 
title and, in such a case, altered the performance required by 
t < parties. In the event a seller is unable to deliver 
marketable title, the buyer is to perform by selecting one of 
two options: either waive the defects and proceed with the 
closing, or declare the Agreement null and void and accept a 
return of the earnest money deposit. In such a case, the 
seller is to perform by either conveying whatever title it has, 
-if* ivt.uni i n$-;, I hi i irnr'\! money deposit to the buyer, at the 
buyer's option. 
Kelley, however, did not tender either of these two 
• options Instead, he tendered a third. Kelley tendered his 
down payment on the condition that First Security "convey 
marketable title to the Property and the water rights that both 
Fi rst Security ai id Kelley intended and agreed would be 
conveyed." Respondent's Brief at 17; R. 61. Thus, Kelley 
sought to require First Security to convey marketable title, 
e v en t: I ic \ I gh s i I ch a c onvey anc e was imp ossible due to int e rvening 
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circumstances, and even though such a conveyance was not 
required by the terms of the Agreement. Such a tender was not 
in conformity with the terms of the Agreement for which the 
parties had bargained and, as such, is the same as if no tender 
was made at all. See Gerritsen v. Draney, 351 P.2d 667, 673 
(Wyo. 1960) (a tender made not in conformity with the contract 
is the same as if no tender is made at all); Johnson v. 
Goldberg, 130 Cal.App.2d 571, 279 P.2d 131 (1955) (conditional 
tender of performance is a refusal to perform). 
Moreover, Kelley1s tender was not deficient merely 
because of the time it was tendered. In fact, Kelley never 
tendered performance as required by the terms of the Agreement 
in the event of unmarketable title problems. Indeed, First 
Security offered to allow closing on October 8, 1987, if Kelley 
would make an unconditional tender of performance. 
(R. 296) Again, however, Kelley refused, stating that First 
Security was obligated to provide a remedy to the title and 
property damages disputes. Indeed, when Kelley initially filed 
this action, the Complaint requested an order of the Court that 
First Security was obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, 
rectify the property damages and then convey the property to 
Kelley. (R. 1-11) It was not until several months later, 
first reflected in the pleadings on November 25, 1987 (R. 140-
274), that Kelley altered his position and requested the Court 
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order First Security tc lonvey wli-^ t- ; * , . - * has" to the 
property plus damages. (R. 181) Even then, Kelley sought 
damages in the form of abatement of the purchase price --a 
remedy not bargained for in the Agreement. 
B First Security Tendered Performance in Accordance 
with the Terms of the Agreement 
Kelley argues that because First Security failed to 
furnish marketable tit] e to the property, First Security failed 
to "perform as agreed" thereby rendering any tender of 
2 performance by Kelley unnecessary. RespondentT s Brief at 
26-31, 35-38. Kelley argues at length that the Agreement 
required First Security to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property. Kelley Ts argument misses the point. First 
Security does not dispute that marketable title could not be 
conveyed due to the discrepancy between the erroneous property 
description and the natural boundaries of the property, and the 
ongoing litigation with t: 1: ie Armstrongs 11 Ie rea 1 issue , and 
the issue which Kelley fails to address, is what First 
Security's obligations were in the event it discovered it could 
not convey marketable title. 
2. At pages 32-34 of his Brief, Kelley also seems to argue 
that the fact that the property is described in the Agreement 
by its street address does not negate the seller's obligation 
to convey the property that the parties agreed constitutes the 
subject of their agreement. Although Kelley suggests that 
Leucadia makes this argument, Leucadia has no knowledge of any 
portion of its brief to which the argument relates. 
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Kelley argues that First Security's inability to 
convey marketable title constituted a breach of the Agreement 
thereby rendering any tender of performance by Kelley 
3 
unnecessary. RespondentT s Brief at 31. This argument 
ignores the express language of the Agreement which anticipated 
and resolved this very question. As noted above, the Agreement 
provides that if the seller is unable to deliver marketable 
title, the seller is to perform by either conveying whatever 
title it has, or returning the earnest money deposit to the 
buyer, at the buyerTs option. 
First Security in fact tendered performance in 
accordance with these terms. By letter dated September 4, 
1987, First Security advised Kelley as follows: 
3. The only case cited by Kelley in support of this argument, 
Willcox Clinic Ltd. v. Evans Products Co., 136 Ariz. 400, 666 
P.2d 500 (App. 1983), is easily distinguishable. In Willcox, 
the purchasers of real property brought an action for 
rescission of the purchase contract based on the sellers' 
failure to provide marketable title as warranted. The Arizona 
Supreme Court held the purchasers were entitled to rescind the 
contract and recover the purchase price paid, noting that the 
"failure to deliver marketable title to property under an 
agreement to provide a warranty deed constitutes a breach of 
the vendor1s contract." 
The Willcox case has no bearing on the issues 
presented here for at least two reasons. First, the purchasers 
in Willcox were seeking the remedy of rescission, not specific 
performance as in this case. Second, it appears the agreement, 
if any, in Willcox did not govern the unmarketable title 
situation. In this case, the Agreement expressly anticipated 
this situation and, in fact, provides the buyer with the option 
of rescinding the contract. 
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First Security is prepared to sell the property 
to you "?as isT without warranty" in accordance 
with the terms of the earnest money. . , , 
Otherwise, if you elect to refuse and walk away 
from the deal, First Security will return the 
$10,000.00 earnest money deposited in escrow to 
you and pursue other alternatives. 
(R. 114-15) 
This tender satisfied First Security's obligations 
under the Agreement. At this point, in accordance with the 
Agreement, Kelley was obliged to accept either of the options 
4 
tendered by First Security. It was KelleyTs failure to 
tender performance by opting for one or the other of the 
alternatives bargained for in the Agreement, and not First 
Sectirity's, that resulted in a breach of the Agreement. 
4. Kelley cites Huck v. Hayes, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977), to 
support his argument that Kelley need not tender performance 
because First Security failed to perform. The facts in Huck, 
however, also are distinguishable from those presented in this 
case. In Huck, the seller was delayed from conveying 
marketable title due to a tax lien. The parties agreed that a 
release of the tax lien should be obtained and then they would 
go forward with the closing. Instead, when the lien was 
removed, the seller indicated he was no longer interested in 
closing the transaction and cited the buyer's failure to make 
payments during the interim period as the breach of the 
agreement which released him from the obligation. The Huck 
court held that the seller was required to perform his part of 
the agreement, i.e., furnish marketable title, as a condition 
precedent to his right to demand that the buyer make payments 
due under the agreement. The Court enforced the contract and 
ordered the seller to convey title to the property that had 
since been cleared. 
(continued on p. 16) 
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G. The Agreement was Properly Terminated by Virtue of 
the Time of Essence Clause 
Kelley?s next argument seems to be that, contrary to 
the teachings of Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Invest., 
Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982) (discussed in 
Appellant's Brief at p. 16-17), the time of essence provision 
did not terminate the Agreement on September 22, 1987, even 
though Kelley had not performed or tendered performance as of 
that date. Kelley argues that First Security waived the time 
of essence provision of the Agreement by its conduct and could 
not then set an "unreasonable deadline'1 for performance. Id. 
at 22-23, 24-26, 42. 
The usual case holding a waiver of the time of essence 
provision by conduct arises in the context of a seller who 
grants the purchaser an indefinite extension of time within 
which to perform. Indeed, the cases cited by Kelley so hold. 
See, e.g., Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980) 
(continued from p. 15) 
In contrast, the Court in this case is not faced with 
a situation of First Security merely deciding that it was "not 
interested" in going forward with the closing. First Security 
was unable to go forward with the closing and unable to convey 
marketable title due to circumstances entirely out of its 
control. Furthermore, the court in Huck apparently was not 
faced with similar contractual provisions. In this case, the 
real issue is what was the nature of the parties' performance 
obligations in the event marketable title could not be 
conveyed. The Huck case has no bearing on this point. 
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(seller waived time of essence provision for payments due for 
purchase of real estate where seller never communicated any 
urgency for buyer to arrange for financing and continually made 
extensions over a nine-month period without setting a specific 
extension deadline) (cited in Respondent's Brief at 23-24); 
Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 251 Pa. Super. 243, 380 A.2d 468 
(1977) (seller waived time of essence provision where seller 
indefinitely extended closing dates until title searches could 
be completed) (cited ; Respondent's Brief at 22). In those 
cases where the seller has waived the time of essence 
provision, h- must give the purchaser a reasonable time within 
\ •• le can declare a termination of an 
earnest money contract. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d at 347. 
Such is not the situation presented in this case, 
1 10wever Ii I this case ,  there is no dispute that the Agreement 
provided that time was of the essence. (R. 117 11 Q; 
Respondentf s Brief at 10) Indeed, the Agreement expressly 
states that the time of essence provision relates "oiil; to 
extensions of the closing date." (R. 117 H Q) With respect to 
the extensions, the time of essence provision was annexed to 
Hie extensions ending on June 1, 1937
 ? o n ju]_y ]_ ^  1987, and on 
August 31, 1987, as each of these extensions was written on a 
form addendum which provided that "all other terms of the 
Agreement shall remain the same." (R. 18-21) (Appendix A) 
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The extension made by letters dated September 4, 1987 
(R. 114) and September 14, 1987 (R. 116) (Appendices B and C, 
respectively), extending the time for performance to 
September 22, 1987, each provided clear notice that if Kelley 
failed to perform by September 22, 1987, his right to purchase 
the property under the earnest money agreement would 
terminate. Any question of First Security's intentions to 
adhere strictly to the time for performance was dispelled by 
its letter dated September 17, 1987 (R. 117-18) (Appendix D), 
which unequivocally stated that if Kelley failed to tender 
performance the Agreement would be considered null and void. 
See Boehnlein v. Ansco, Inc., 61 Or.App. 389, 657 P.2d 702 
(1983); Wachung Realty & Development Co. v. Llewellyn Holding 
Corp., 126 A. 326 (N.J. 1924). 
Thus, the conduct surrounding the extensions agreed to 
between First Security and Kelley does not give rise to a claim 
of waiver of the time of essence provision. First Security 
never granted an indefinite extension of time for closing the 
transaction. Each extension clearly and unequivocally stated 
that failure to perform would result in the Agreement being 
declared null and void, either by annexation of the words "time 
is of the essence" or by clear indications that failure to 
perform would not be excused. 
-18-
Assuming the Court finds the time of essence provision 
was waived by the conduct of First Security, the question of 
what notice was reasonable is one of fact and is not 
appropriate for summary judgment. See, e.g., Bell v. Yale 
Dev. Co., 102 111. App. 3d 108, 429 N.E.2d 894 (1981) (30 days 
reasonable notice under the circumstances); Drazin v. American 
Oil Co., 395 A.2d 32 (D.C. 1978) (15 days notice reasonable 
under the circumstances); Bishop v. Tolbert, 249 S.C. 289, 153 
S.E.2d 912 (1967) (1 day notice reasonable under the 
circumstances); Doering v. Fields, 187 Md. 484, 50 A.2d 553 
(1947) (10 days notice reasonable under the circumstances). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE 
PARTIES' AGREEMENT AND ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
TERMS NOT FOUND IN THE AGREEMENT. 
In Point VI of his brief, Kelley argues that "[e]ven 
though First Security could not convey the quality of title 
called for by the Agreement, it was obligated to convey title 
and abate the purchase price/1 Respondenty s Brief at 41. The 
remedy of abatement, however, is not one that was bargained for 
by the parties to the agreement. Kelley discusses two cases in 
support of his argument that First Security is obligated to 
transfer what interest it can and to abate the purchase price. 
-19-
The first of these cases, Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 
1374 (Utah 1980)5 (cited in Respondent's Brief at 39), 
involved a contract for the purchase of commercial property on 
which the seller was to construct a four-plex. Seller failed 
to perform and the buyer brought an action for specific 
performance. At trial, the buyer presented evidence that the 
seller had encumbered the land in question with something other 
than the building bargained for. In that case, the court 
ordered specific performance and held that the seller was 
required to remove the encumbrance prior to the buyer taking 
the possession of the property. The court noted that this 
"removal" could be accomplished either by a reduction in the 
purchase price in the amount of the encumbrance, or payment of 
the total price after the seller removed the encumbrance. 610 
P.2d at 1379-80. 
The case at hand, however, does not involve a 
situation where the property has been encumbered by a structure 
or lien that deteriorated the value of the land and which could 
be cured by "removal." More importantly, the contract at issue 
5. Kelley also cites Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980), for the proposition that KelleyTs tender of performance 
was not a prerequisite for an action for specific performance 
because the failure to tender was excused by First Security's 
failure to perform. As discussed in Point II B, supra, 
however, First Security tendered performance by letter dated 
September 4, 1987. 
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in Reed apparently did not address the situation presented in 
that case. Here, however, the contract expressly anticipated 
the situation of unmarketable title and the parties expressly 
bargained for the remedies available in such an event. 
Kelley also cites Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 
(Utah 1976), at page 41 of his Brief, for the proposition that 
abatement is an appropriate remedy. In Castagno, the sellers 
were unable to convey water rights they had contracted to 
convey along with the sale of land. The court ordered specific 
performance by the seller to the extent the seller was able to 
perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency in water rights based on the following 
circumstances: 
At the time of the execution of the contract, 
[sellers] knew there was no existing water right 
to the well. They undertook the duty to procure 
such a right, but they made no provision in the 
contract to excuse them, if the State Engineer 
did not grant their change application to divert 
a water right to the well. 
552 P.2d at 1284. Obviously, this holding has no application 
in this case where the Agreement expressly contained a 
provision to excuse the performance required in the event First 
Security was unable to convey marketable title. In this case, 
the remedies bargained for in the Agreement in the event of 
unmarketable title govern the options available to the parties. 
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Interestingly, Kelley fails to note that the recent 
opinion of this Court in Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 
App. 1987) (discussed in other sections of KelleyTs Brief), is 
dispositive of this issue. In Barker, the parties to an 
earnest money agreement had negotiated to exchange certain 
lands. However, the first party discovered it could not convey 
title to the entire parcel of land under consideration. The 
second party requested that because the first party couldn't 
convey title to a portion of the property, the contract should 
be modified and the first party required to purchase the second 
party's property for cash. The trial court denied the second 
party's request to modify the contract. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, 
noting that tf[w]hile a court may interpret contracts which are 
open to interpretation, a court may not make a new one for the 
parties and may not alter or amend one which the parties 
themselves have made." 741 P.2d at 553 (citations omitted; 
emphasis original.) The Court further noted: 
[Where] the agreement is for an exchange of 
lands, to compel specific performance thereof as 
to that portion of the land to which the 
defendant has title, and to render a money 
judgment against him for the value of that 
portion which he is unable to convey, would 
require the performance of a contract which the 
defendant did not make. 
741 P.2d at 553. 
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The Agreement in this case is clear with respect to 
the remedies of the parties in the event of an unmarketable 
title. The Agreement clearly provides that if the seller 
cannot deliver title free of defects not curable through an 
escrow agreement at closing, the buyer has the option of 
(1) waiving the defects and proceeding with the closing, or 
(2) requiring the seller to return the earnest money deposit 
and declaring the Agreement null and void. (R. 15 H G) 
Nowhere in this Agreement is the remedy of abatement provided. 
Had Kelley wanted such an option in the event of unmarketable 
title, such a remedy should have been written in the contract 
and bargained for with First Security along with the other 
terms. 
The lower court erred by altering the terms of the 
Agreement and ordering specific performance of terms not found 
in the Agreement. Under the Agreement, if Kelley wanted a 
reduced purchase price, his option was to declare the Agreement 
null and void, to have his earnest money returned to him, and 
to submit a new offer with a lower purchase price. This would 
have left First Security free to accept the lower price, if it 
so desired, or to negotiate with other interested buyers for a 
different price. Inasmuch as the terms of the Agreement are 
clear, however, the lower court erred by requiring First 
Security to perform a contract which it did not make. 
-23-
CONCLUSION 
It is indeed curious that Kelley in his Brief fails to 
recognize and deal with the terms of the Agreement which were 
bargained for by the parties in the event that title was 
unmarketable. These terms altered the performance required by 
the parties in such an event. Viewed in this way, it is clear 
that First Security tendered the performance required in the 
unmarketable title situation. It is equally clear that Kelley 
never tendered performance consistent with the terms of the 
Agreement. As such, the Agreement expired by its own terms and 
is incapable of being specifically enforced. 
Moreover, the Agreement which the trial court did 
enforce was not the parties1 Agreement. Rather, the trial 
court rewrote the terms of the Agreement, added the remedy of 
abatement to the remedies actually bargained for the parties, 
and enforced this new Agreement. As this Court recently noted 
in Barker, a court may not make a new contract for the parties 
and may not alter or amend one which the parties themselves 
have made. 
-24-
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ordering 
specific performance of the Agreement and should be reversed. 
3Pt!L DATED this ^*^ day of March, 1989. 
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AL^ENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes (X) a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the 3 Q day ot Fg lQr» \Qr"y 19-67". between . U j l U l O f r i 
ft. Ketlfy.-Tr. as buyer(s). and _asseller(s). 
covering real property described as follows: 
SummitCriun-Vy, U;b~ih 
The (ollowing terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
(. Qir^lnn^g p r ^ c 4-^ hf 4fo^ SOJOT)r~\ mi'4-in, -1-<~>4-n I fnmFfrr-
• ^ 
by SeUery U.li^n T°7o In te rs^ o n l y pftymf.ohfb - ^ — - - > »„ •» y .- . j ^ » w . . *~*~*—w • ——• w * « - — — ' ' * V~ ^ v j i 1 I U I l u>—J
<Oi_tr>rfprfy QpH (pfllnn^e d a f 1 r\ - ful l Q mnnfh^frnm 
prty-o££ nC 4-hi'c n d i . Lonn £ r ^ 4-r^  hf. onp. p^rrgof-r>f nnnrt-qny ^ ( i n f pLns=> iregu <n<r HosTng (»O^T-_^ 
2, C-io^inc] - b be on gr br-Porr. Afrril ac, iQ67 
3. P.nrrgnfc: f*<trl\P<f>{ sjtrygy m'l I I he. prnyirlgM foy .SFMFJK-
All other terms ot THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same Jj^tSelle^XXBuyer shall have until -^ • HC\ (A-M-/P.M. 
M l l O r O . P i ^ 1 Q 6 f lo accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date February av, (487" Signature of ()() Seller ( ) Buyer 
Time 5'QQ (^ 7PM.) ^MTj 5^°M^ /Ty ^7 
4 7^ ^-^ A ^ ^ Q ^ T 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
( ^ I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
MtfcA-L-
Signature Date 
(Initials) 
( ^ I nereby A U L t H i the foregoing on 
I ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUI 
{LIIIL^Q\JIIL^ 
Signature / / " ^ 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoipg 
S7~ \X& 
Time 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
£~>l -X 
Date Signature of Seller/s) Date 
I personally caused a fjftal copy of the foregoing bearma.appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19JLZ-, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (^) Seller ( ) Buyer 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This A O D E N O U M / C O U N T E R OFFER constitutes ( ) a C O U N T E R OFFER ^Xi^an A D O E N D U M to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the „sJ_L'/jL- day of _ _ . r'-a-bs^*'J 19 ' ^ b e t w e e n , 
A)^ asbuyer(s) and Ft' 1 A/-< *-J«^ - A} &/Lfcjf 
covering real property described as follows 
asselter(s) 
" ^ o Ld__C J&LJI-U/ _ i : 4 w _£__ 
.P^ILJJJ^ K~r: 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
£ZIA±!C±C. rl^TK. A***.Lf Hs/$.r*4*c>L & ~-0^ C)/z__Jy-£v. 
-JTu.rJJL- L LlC 7L 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller (^<£ Buyer shall have until - ^ 0 O ( A M P M ) 
to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date . 
Time 
Y V •» -i- 7 
^jLJt- •<£]£) 
Signature o f ^ J - S e l l e t ( ) Buyer 
&>. 
-P< *'y*'-£^L, 
i? 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
( ^ ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the fo#Qf>ing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum t llUM \*~*mr 
Signature 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing . 
Signature pm 
(Initials) 
OAte Time 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
fa/) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
Signature o1 Bufats) rf 1/ dale ' Signature of Seiiertb> 
{K) I personally caused a fm^r copv of tHe foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Date 
Sent by 
MM i a 
ADD/ M)UIW/lUl irv ir>nurrLi \ r 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
T h i » A D O E N D U M / C O U N T E R OFFER constitutes ( ) • C O U N T E R OFFER ( X) 8" A D D E N D U M to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the _2 Oth
 day 0, February_ ^_6_2 h>iw»>n W i l l i a m 
K e l l e y ..sbuyer(si and F i r s t S e c u r i t y Mtg._ 
covenna real property described as follows 
32TD_ W. Snows Lane __ 
Park City, Utah 
. asseller(s). 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
Closing date hereby extended to on or before July 1, 1987 
/ /** 
IJUTZ* 
/ 
V* (<*-? /* C/J. 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller If- ) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0 (JtXiK'P M ) 
J u n e 1 19_8_7. to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
n„ 0 May 2 8 , 1 9 8 7 
Time /* . ' 'V ( V H T T / P M ) 
Signature of (X ) Sel ler ( ) Buyer 
^ 
-7—f ^/wrt^ T 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
bS) l hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specif ied above 
(/ ) I hereby AG^ fcPT th3 foc*ar3ing SUBJECT TO the except ions shown on the at tached Addendum 
Signature 
(Initials) 
i xi  
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
copy of the foregoing bear ing all s ignatures 
Signature of Buyensi Date Signature ol Seiiertsi 
(•X^ I personal ly caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropr ia te s ignatures to be mai led on *°/ •^ 
1 9 - S Z L . by Certifje>-foT^i and return receipt-attached hereto to the (yC± Seller ( ) Buyer 
' « n o ? o 
Date 
^pnt bv 
AI^ _ ENDUM/COUNTER OFFERS 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This AOOENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER ^xf an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
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/2 ' PM. 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller (y$ Buyer shall have until // / & / ' (A M / P M ) 
/ * 1Q A / to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date 
Time 
7-4-^7 Signature of ^<"Seller ( ) Buyer 
(A M /P M.) -J&LSJTye ^ . ^ • ? 4 
ACCEPTANCECOUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
( \ 4 I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
) I hereby ACCEPJ the/oreg^yjg SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
Signature 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing . 
Signature 
. (Initials) 
1 ? UlSL 
Time 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
in/n '^t, > T)t- MW '-& >• isf ry 
Signature of Buyensi / / jbafe ^^ Signaty^ot Setiertsi/f Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on ^J L^^i^y - y T~*-\ 
/y-J- > 
1 9 . , by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (X) Seller ( ) Buyer T 
Sent by U'AtiU^ ft ifCjLJLifr-
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RAY, OUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ALONZO W WATSON. JR. 
STEPHEN B NEBEKER 
MITCHELL MELICH 
L RIDD LARSON 
DON B ALLEN 
MERLIN O BAKER 
CLARK P GILES 
JAMES W FREED 
NARRVEL E HALL 
JAMES L WILDE 
M JOHN ASHTON 
HERBERT C LIVSEY 
WILLIAM A MARSHALL 
JAMES Z DAVIS 
J M ICHAEL KELLY 
PAUL S FELT 
GERALD T SNOW 
ALAN A ENKE 
JONATHAN A DIBBLE 
SCOTT H CLARK 
STEVEN H G U N N 
JAMES S JARDINE 
KENT H MURDOCK 
JANET HUGIE SMITH 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
ROBERT P HILL 
RICHARD G ALLEN 
ANTHONY W SCHOF1ELD 
ALLEN L ORR 
BRAD D HARDY 
BRIAN E KATZ 
A ROBERT THORUP 
JOHN P HARRINGTON <COLO. & TEXAS* 
LARRY G MOORE 
ANTHONY B OUINN 
THOMAS L KAY 
BRUCE L OLSON 
JOHN A ADAMS 
DOUGLAS M MONSON 
CRAIG CARLILE 
STEVEN W HARRIS 
RICHARD H CASPER 
JAMES M DESTER <COLO. ONLYl 
KEVIN G GLADE 
JEFFREY D EISENBERG 
ENID GREENE 
LESTER K ESSIG 
IRA B RUBINFELD 
STEPHEN C TINGEY 
CRAIG L TAYLOR 
KELLY J FLINT 
MARK O MORRIS 
STEVEN J AESCHBACHER 
PAUL D NEWMAN 
KEITH A KELLY 
4 0 0 D E S E R E T B U I L D I N G 
7 9 S O U T H M A I N S T R E E T 
P O ©OX 4 5 3 6 5 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6^1*45-0385 
T E L E P H O N E (BOD 5 3 2 - 1 5 0 0 
TELECOPIER NO (SOI) 6 3 2 - 7 5 4 3 
2 I O F I R S T S E C U R I T Y B A N K B L D O 
9 2 N O R T H U N I V E R S I T Y A V E N U E 
PROVO, UTAH 8<460l-«4-420 
( S O I ) 2 2 6 - 7 2 I O 
1 0 2 0 F I R S T S E C U R I T Y B A N K B L D G 
2 4 0 4 W A S H I N G T O N B O U L E V A R D 
O G D E N , UTAH 8 - 4 * 0 1 - 2 3 0 6 
( B O D © 2 I - 0 7 I 3 
or C O U N S E L 
ALBERT R BOWEN 
W J O'CONNOR. JR 
PAUL H RAY (1603-1067) 
C PRESTON ALLEN ( I02 I - I07 I ) 
MARVIN J BERTOCH (1015*1078) 
A H NEBEKER ( I 6 0 3 - I 0 6 0 ) 
S J . OUINNEY (1603-1063) 
September 4, 1987 
William Kelly 
Courtney Industries 
84 3 Nantasket Avenue 
Hull, Massachusetts 02045 
William Kelly 
P.O. Box 257 
Hull, Massachusetts 02045 
Re: Park City, Utah Property 
Dear Mr. Kelly: 
As you may be aware, this firm represents First Security Mortgage 
Company in a lawsuit against Mel and Herb Armstrong to establish 
correct boundaries and quiet title to certain land and water rights 
appurtenant to property located at 320 West Snows Lane in Park City, 
Utah. In February of this year you entered into negotiations with 
First Security for the purchase of the property. Those negotiations 
culminated in your acceptance on March 2nd of a counteroffer, dated 
February 27th, by First Security. The agreement provided for closing 
within 60 days of acceptance by the seller. However, the closing 
has been extended by several addenda, the last of which provided 
for closing by the end of August. The purpose cf this letter is 
to advise you that First Security is hereby extending the closing 
date to September 15, 1987, at which time First Security will consider 
the agreement to have terminated by its own terms. 
First Security is prepared to sell the property to you H,as 
is1 without warranty" in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement. First Security is also prepared to assign you its 
rights in the lawsuit against the Armstrongs. Absent any obligation 
EXHIBIT 
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to the contrary or reimbursement from you for its legal costs and 
fees, First Security is no longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit 
with the Armstrongs. First Security has not pursued the legal action 
against the Armstrongs as a result of any legal obligation, but simply 
because of its interest in closing the deal with you. First Security 
has never viewed itself as having the obligation to clear title, 
nor does the earnest money agreement provide for that obligation. 
Accordingly, as indicated above, First Security will sell the property 
in accordance with the terms of the earnest money agreement, as extended 
by this letter to September 15th. Otherwise, if you elect to refuse 
and walk away from the deal, First Security will return the $10,000.00 
earnest money deposited in escrow to you and pursue other alternatives. 
I am aware that you have some questions regarding the legal 
issues of the lawsuit and strongly encourage you tc obtain legal 
counsel to advise you concerning those issues. I will be happy to 
cocperate with whomever ycu select as counsel in order that you can 
make a fully informed judgment. Otherwise, if you would like to 
discuss this matter with me personally, please do not hesitate to 
call. If I do not hear from ycu or a representative by the close 
of business on September 15th, I will consider the agreement as having 
expired and will have the funds in escrow returned tc you. 
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. I sincerely 
hope that this matter can be resolved quickly and in the best interests 
of all involved. 
Sincerely, 
RAJ- QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
CLT/jp 
cc. Wayne Lantz 
Dave Grant 
Don Griffin 
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KEITH A. KELLY 
4 0 0 DESERET BUILDING 
7© SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P. O. BOX -45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-41-45-0385 
TELEPHONE (BOD 5 3 2 - I S O O 
TELECOPIER NO. (SOI) 532-75*3 
2IO FIRST SECURITY BANK B L D G . 
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or COUNSEL 
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September 14, 1987 
Dan Egan HAND DELIVERED 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: First Security Bank's Sale of 320 West 
Snows Lane Property in Park City to 
William Kelly 
Dear Dan: 
This letter confirms my agreement to extend the closing date 
to the close of business on September 22, 1987. This extension is 
granted on the basis that Mr. Kelly did not receive my letter dated 
September 4, 1987, until September 8, 1987. A copy of my September 
4th letter to Mr, Kelly is attached. Beyond the extension to September 
22nd, granted herein, the effects of the September 4th letter remain 
in full force and effect. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
JINNEY & NEBEKER 
CLT/jp 
Enc. 
cc. Wayne Lantz 
Don Griffin 
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PAUL H. RAY (1803-1007) 
C. PRESTON ALLEN ( lO2l- l©70 
MARVIN J . BERTOCH (1015-1078) 
A. H. NEBEKER (1805-1060) 
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HAND DELIVERED 
David Olsen 
Dan W. Egan 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt LakQ City, Utah 84101 
Re: First Security Bank's Sale of 320 West 
Snows Lane Property in Park City to 
William Kelly 
Dear David and Dan: 
This letter is in response to your request on September 15th 
that First Security extend the closing date for the sale of the Park 
City property to the end of the month. My letter addressed to Dan, 
dated September 14, 1987, indicated that First Security would extend 
the closing date to September 22, 1987. First Security is not willing 
to grant an additional extension. Nor is First Security willing 
to extend credit at the rate provided in the Earnest Money Agreement 
beyond the period specified therein. As previously indicated, First 
Security is prepared to sell the property to Mr. Kelly "'as is1 
without Warranty" in accordance with the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. First Security is not obligated to clear title prior 
t o c o n v eying the property to Mr. Kelly. Any suggestion that the 
limiting language mentioned above refers only to personal property 
is absurd. 
OncQ again, if the sale is not closed by close of business on 
September 22nd, First Security will return the $10,000.00 earnest 
money deposited in escrow and pursue other alternatives. First 
Security will not consider the act of placing $140,000.00 in escrow 
as sufficient to close the deal. 
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In our conversation you indicated that one of Mr, Kelly's 
concerns was the prospect of pursuing a lawsuit against his 
neighbors should he buy the property with the lawsuit at this time. 
I previously made the offer to Don Griffin that First Security would 
be willing to extend the closing and pursue the lawsuit against the 
Armstrongs if Mr. Kelly is willing to pay the attorney's fees and 
costs associated with pursuing that action. I am willing to discuss 
this proposal with you, but this question must be resolved prior 
to the 22nd of September. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
RAX-r, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
- ^ C r a i g L./jfaylor 
CLT/jp 
cc. Wayne Lantz 
Dave Grant 
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